The Eastern Partnership aims to deepen cooperation between the European Union and the post-Soviet countries Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. However, the ongoing pandemic recently ruled out this project within the EU. The Eastern Partnership summit has been postponed a total of three times. This despite the fact that the existing plan for the initiative – the 20 deliverables for 2020 – expired at the end of last year. Following these postponements, the leaders of the Member States met in December under the leadership of the Slovenian Presidency of the Council of the European Union.

The region of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus has itself, in the meantime, been confronted with a series of crises and political upheavals. In addition to last year’s pro-democracy protests in Belarus, the region has also been rocked by fighting for Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Georgia is grappling with internal issues, including the arrest of former President Mikheil Saakashvili upon his return to his country in October. In a politically polarized Moldova, Maia Sandu became the first woman to hold the presidency following a hotly contested election. Traditionally, Ukraine has faced some rather unique problems, as it is still heavily affected by the military aggression of Putin’s Russia in the Donbass region. Kiev is also grappling with the growing influence of the oligarchs and internal political tensions.

The Eastern Partnership was officially established in 2009 during the Czech Presidency of the Council of the EU and remains an important project for the country’s diplomacy. Nothing has changed in this regard in the four years since the initiative’s last regular summit. During this period, Czech foreign policy aligned itself with a group of like-minded states particularly favorable to the development of EU eastern policy. The Czech Republic has played an active role in attempts to resolve the crisis in Belarus. For example, Prague supported an extraordinary summit of EU leaders and started providing more aid to Belarusians who had to flee the country. In the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Czech diplomacy called for an end to the violence and offered to play the role of mediator between the two parties. Beyond that, the country has tended to stick to the broader EU position on the issue. This approach was marked by the emphasis on humanitarian issues and the recognition of the immediate impact of the military conflict on local citizens.

In addition, the Czech government joined a group of countries calling for the provision of COVID-19 vaccines to Eastern Partnership countries, which suffered from shortages in this regard. Despite this, the vaccine flow from the multilateral COVAX program has not proven to be very effective and has instead undermined Europe’s reputation vis-à-vis other global players in the region. Individual countries in the EU have compensated for this problem by offering their own aid, most often to their nearest neighbors. The Czech Republic has decided to send effective protective equipment in the fight against COVID-19, as well as financial assistance. However, the country has yet to offer its own vaccines to Eastern Partnership countries.

A new chance

The Czech Republic will assume its next Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2022. This represents a good opportunity for Prague to take some elements of the Eastern Partnership agenda to a higher level. These problems are particularly linked to the social resilience of the participating post-Soviet republics. This includes combating disinformation and hybrid threats, or any other foreign interference in domestic politics, especially on the part of Russia. Of course, helping these countries’ economic recovery after the pandemic will also be important. It would also be desirable to involve these states in the green transformation. This can be accomplished through various investment projects and by sharing the know-how of European practice.

At the level of the Visegrad group, which includes Hungary, Poland and Slovakia with the Czech Republic, discussions are underway to strengthen security cooperation with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. These three states have all signed Association Agreements with the EU. The Visegrad four raised this issue in a joint statement on the future of the Eastern Partnership in April this year. In addition, the document also promotes the basic principles of this partnership and expresses its solidarity with countries facing challenges for their sovereignty and territorial integrity from the Russian Federation. Moscow continues to de facto occupy parts of the territory of these three states.

The Eastern Partnership countries face a number of challenges on the way to European integration. Among other things, they must complete their social transformations and carry out the necessary reforms. For this reason, it will be important for the Czech Republic to double this Eastern political format within the EU, especially when challenged by Member States who have other priorities.

The Eastern Partnership summit in December must agree on a sufficiently ambitious agenda that can be tackled in the new year. The Joint Staff Working Document, an information document outlining the EU’s priorities in the region after 2020, presented some possible items on the agenda. After the summit, it will be necessary to put into practice what has been agreed. Czech diplomacy then has the opportunity to make concrete commitments on the basis of the EU’s long-term eastern policy priorities. These include, for example, the strengthening of investments in public administration reform in different countries. Another important issue is digitization, on which the Czech Republic has traditionally cooperated with Estonia.

It is clear that the various crises in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus will not simply go away. In addition, Belarus, which became more dependent on Moscow following last year’s rigged elections and the mass protests that followed, officially declared its suspension from the Eastern Partnership. This naturally further restricts EU policy in the region.

How to restore your credibility

In this context, European and Czech diplomacy should focus mainly on the three countries which have signed association agreements with the EU. Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova clearly want closer cooperation with the EU27 and ultimately hope to formalize this growing alliance. Prague should continue to emphasize the western orientation of Ukraine and Georgia within the EU and NATO. A great opportunity has presented itself given recent developments in Moldova, where pro-reform and Western-minded elites have become an influencing force. This was clearly demonstrated in the recent presidential and parliamentary elections. In any case, contact with civil society in the six countries remains in the long term interests of the Czech Republic. This is true even if it is only a matter of cooperation with opposition circles, as is the case in Belarus.

Czech foreign policy should use all available means to ensure that the Eastern Partnership receives not only sufficient financial resources, but also greater flexibility as regards the participation of individual actors. Concretely, this means that the three countries which have signed association agreements should be able to establish closer contacts with the EU more easily. At the same time, the Czech Republic must not withdraw from the fundamental objectives of the Eastern Partnership, even after twelve years. These long-term priorities include fighting corruption, promoting the rule of law, consolidating democratic processes, defending human rights and supporting the non-profit sector and independent media.

This will be particularly important in the case of the future position of the EU vis-à-vis Belarus. The Czech Republic should seek creative ways to involve the country and its citizens in the Eastern Partnership, while minimizing contact with the dictatorial regime of Alyaksandr Lukashenka. Minsk eliminates all forms of protest and increasingly submits to Moscow’s interests. We can see this in the case of the current migrant crisis on the Belarusian-Polish border, which is largely the result of Lukashenka’s own personal provocations. The situation surrounding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will continue to demand a clear position. This is especially true given the international interest in the conflict, with the dispute also involving Russia, Turkey and other actors. A new opportunity for Czech diplomacy is also presented by the Crimean Platform, initiated last year by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. This project aims to promote the return of occupied Crimea to Ukraine. Within the framework of this international cooperation, the Czech Republic can restore its credibility as a supporter of an independent Ukraine and build on its reputation as a state which defends human rights and democracy in the world.

Pavel Havlicek is a researcher at the Research Center of the Association for International Affairs. His research focuses on Eastern Europe, in particular Ukraine and Russia, and the Eastern Partnership. It also deals with questions of strategic communication and disinformation as well as democratization and support for civil society.

This article is supported by the Czech-Polish Forum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic.

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Czech foreign policy, Czech Republic, Eastern Partnership